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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JIM CRITTENDEN, : 
Plaintiff- : Case No. 970091-CA 
Appellant, 
vs. Oral Argument 
: Priority 15 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-
Appellee. : 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This case concerns two issues: 
1. Whether Alpine School District denied appellant Jim 
Crittenden of his employment without an adequate pre-termination 
hearing in violation of his right to due process. 
2. Whether appellant Jim Crittenden was entitled to early 
retirement benefits. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a breach of contract action, the appellate 
court must address questions both of fact and of law. In a summary 
judgment context, the facts are to be resolved in favor of the non-
moving party, while the legal issues are to be reviewed for 
correctness. Stevenson v. F. C. Life Ins. Co.. 827 P.2d 973 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
With regard to Mr. Crittenden's early retirement benefits, 
the appellate court is obliged to construe plaintiff's complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the judgment can be 
affirmed only if it clearly appears that there is no set of facts 
that can support the plaintiff's claim. Olsen v. Hoolev, 865 P.2d 
1345, 1346 (Utah 1993); Colman v. Utah State Landlord, 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990); Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107 (Utah 
App. 1990). On summary judgment, this issue is reviewed for 
correctness, since factual disputes are automatically resolved in 
the appellant's favor, and the only remaining issue is a 
determination of how the facts apply to the law governing early 
retirement. Stevenson, 827 P.2d at 973. 
PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is a wrongful termination 
action arising from the termination of appellant by the appellee. 
This action also involves deprivation by the appellee of early 
retirement benefits to which appellant asserts a claim. 
B. Proceedings Below. Mr. Crittenden filed a motion for 
summary judgment on May 31, 1996, to which the defendant filed a 
cross-motion on June 14, 1996. The Court granted the defendant's 
motion, ruling that, even in the amended complaint, Crittenden was 
challenging only the manner in which he was terminated, and that 
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nothing was amiss, either within district policy or within the law, 
with the manner of Crittenden's termination. (Ruling, at 3-11) 
The Court also ruled that (a) Crittenden was not entitled to 
early retirement because the request was past a district-imposed 
deadline, (b) Crittenden was not "employed* at the time of his 
request, and (c) that Crittenden was not in the class of employees 
for which early retirement was intended. (Ruling, at 11-13) 
C. Facts. In 1991, appellant, Mr. Jim Crittenden, was the 
director of transportation for appellee, Alpine School District, 
and had been an employee of the school district for 33 years. 
(Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
5 6; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants7 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Undisputed 
Facts, 1 1) 
On June 5, 1991, the assistant superintendent of the 
Alpine School District met with Mr. Crittenden for 15 to 20 minutes 
(Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, J5 3-6), asking Mr. Crittenden if 
he had used school district purchase orders to buy approximately 
$650 (Affidavit of Gary V. Keetch, Exhibit A) worth of parts for 
vehicles belonging to Mr. Crittenden and a friend of his. Mr. 
Crittenden answered that he had, but was not given an opportunity 
to explain why or to point out that his actions were common and 
accepted practices in the school district. (Affidavit of Jim F. 
Crittenden, f 6; Crittenden Depo. at 46, 51, 58, 61, 171) Mr. 
Crittenden did, however, mention that he would like to take early 
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retirement. (Affidavit of Gary V. Keetch, Exhibit A) The assistant 
superintendent told him to go home and wait to hear from the school 
district. (Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, f 6) 
Mr. Crittenden and the assistant superintendent met 
again later that day for five or ten minutes. (Affidavit of Jim F. 
Crittenden, f 9) The assistant superintendent had Mr. Crittenden 
read a letter from the school district explaining that he was being 
placed on immediate suspension without pay and would be terminated 
in 15 days. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material 
Undisputed Facts, If 12-13) Again, Mr. Crittenden was not given an 
opportunity to explain his actions, but he again requested early 
retirement. (Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, f 9; Affidavit of Gary 
V. Keetch, Exhibits A) 
The following day, Mr. Crittenden formally submitted a 
written request for early retirement. (Affidavit of Jim F. 
Crittenden, f 15; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material 
Undisputed Facts, f 15) The school district conducted a post-
termination hearing in September, 1991, after which it informed Mr. 
Crittenden that his termination had been upheld. (Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Statement of Material Undisputed Facts, ff 18, 20) 
Mr. Crittenden filed suit in January, 1993, and alleged 
that the manner of his termination was improper and that he was 
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entitled to early retirement benefits. (Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial) He filed an amended complaint on August 30, 1996, in 
which he further alleged that the district breached the employment 
contract. (Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial) 
Alpine School District has stated that it "objects to 
and deplores any insinuation on the part of the plaintiff to 
suggest that defendant denied plaintiff early retirement due to a 
clerical oversight in the filling out of forms." (Defendant's 
Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, #26). In 
fact, Alpine School District expressly stated that tt[a]s 
communicated over and over to plaintiff and his attorney by 
defendant and its attorney in 1991, plaintiff failed to qualify for 
district early retirement because his employment was involuntarily 
terminated due to criminal acts." (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment in favor of Alpine School District was 
improper because there are disputed issues of material fact and the 
District Court incorrectly applied the law to the facts. 
Summary judgment regarding the adequacy of the pr ex-
termination hearing should be reversed because it is disputed 
whether Mr. Crittenden had an opportunity to "tell his side of the 
story," and whether his further explanation would have altered the 
course of his termination. Also, the cases on which the District 
Court relied are distinguishable from this one. 
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Summary judgment regarding his entitlement to early 
retirement benefits should also be reversed because Mr. Crittenden 
had a vested right to the benefits and Alpine School District was 
contractually obligated to grant them. The District Court 
improperly based its decision on the timeliness of his application, 
an argument Alpine School District waived or otherwise failed to 
plead. The District Court also based its decision on terms it 
improperly imposed on school district policy regarding restrictions 
on eligibility for the early retirement benefits. Furthermore, if 
under the policy the early retirement benefits are limited to 
workers who "need to get away from the daily grind," there is a 
disputed issue of fact regarding whether that was part of Mr. 
Crittenden's motivation for applying for the benefits. Finally, he 
was deprived of the benefits without due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRE-TERMINATION HEARING 
In considering whether there exist genuine issues of material 
fact, the Court does not weigh the evidence, but instead inquires 
whether a reasonable jury faced with the evidence presented could 
return a verdict for the non-moving party. W. M. Barnes Co. v. 
Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Spor v. 
Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). All 
material facts properly asserted and supported by a party shall be 
deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing 
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party. Further, the trial court must interpret the relevant facts 
in a light favorable to the non-moving party. Stevenson v. F. C. 
Life Ins. Co.. 827 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, there are issues of fact regarding the adequacy 
of Mr. Crittenden's pre-termination hearing which were improperly 
resolved in favor of Alpine School District, and which should have 
precluded summary judgment. It is undisputed that Mr. Crittenden 
was an employee of the school district with a constitutionally 
protected property interest in his employment. As such, he was 
entitled to a pre-termination hearing under Cleveland Board of 
Education v. Loudermill. 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). The United States 
Supreme Court in Loudermill explained that a pre-termination 
hearing "need not be elaborate." Nevertheless, it identified the 
elements essential to an adequate pre-termination hearing. The 
Court stated that, ,f[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to 
oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side 
of the story.ff Id^ at 1497. 
In this case there is a factual dispute as to whether Mr. 
Crittenden was given an opportunity to present his side of the 
story prior to termination. He had one meeting with the assistant 
superintendent prior to termination which lasted no more than 15 to 
20 minutes. According to Mr. Crittenden, he did not have an 
opportunity to explain his actions, a fact that should be 
interpreted in a light favorable to Mr. Crittenden. Part of Mr. 
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Crittenden's explanation, had he been permitted to voice it, would 
have been that his actions were actually common and accepted 
practice in the school district, another fact that should be 
interpreted in a light favorable to him, and which would have been 
relevant to whether the termination was erroneous, and whether the 
penalty was proportional to the infraction. See, Salt Lake City 
Corp, v. Salt Lake Citv Civ. Serv. , 908 P.2d 871 (Utah 1995), 
(holding that in disciplining civil servants, the penalty must be 
proportional to the infraction). 
Furthermore, this case is distinguishable from the cases on 
which the District Court relied as authority for its legal 
determination. The District Court held that the hearing in this 
case was sufficiently similar to the hearings sustained as 
constitutionally sound in Powell v. Mikuleckv. 891 F.2d 1454 (10th 
Cir. 1989), and Kellv v. Smith. 764 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir. 1985). A 
closer look at those cases is enlightening. 
In Powell the court found that the employee had been afforded 
an opportunity to explain his side of the story because the 
employee had ended the discussion by refusing to respond to further 
inquiries. Powell, 891 F.2d at 1459. In this case, however, Mr. 
Crittenden was not able to fully explain his side of the story 
because he was directed to go home and wait to hear from the school 
district. 
Like Mr. Crittenden's meeting with Alpine School District 
administrators, the hearing in Kelly was also very brief, but the 
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court in Kellv nonetheless sustained the hearing as adequate. This 
is because the reason the employee gave in his defense for failing 
to fulfill an obligation of his employment, that he was not on-call 
at the time, was untrue and within the personal knowledge of the 
supervisor terminating him. In this case, however, Alpine School 
District had no knowledge of Mr. Crittenden's reasons for his 
conduct, nor did Alpine School District ask for, nor did it desire 
any explanation or reason for Mr. Crittenden's actions. Mr. Crit-
tenden, given the opportunity, could have and would have provided 
explanations of his conduct which were not known by the assistant 
superintendent and which would have been relevant to whether the 
termination was warranted. Similarly, the other cases cited in 
Powell, Riacrins v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 
790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986), and Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827 
(1st Cir. 1985), are also distinguishable from the instant case. 
Those cases involved pre-termination hearings which lasted an hour 
or more—substantially longer than Mr. Crittenden's pre-termination 
meeting with Alpine School District officials. Because the cases 
it cited in its decision were not on-point, the District Court's 
reliance upon those cases in its decision was in error. 
Recognizing these disputed issues of fact, the District Court 
erred by making its own factual determinations. Instead of 
interpreting the facts in a light favorable to Mr. Crittenden, the 
District Court determined that 15 to 20 minutes gave the parties 
ample time for "some other give and take." (Ruling, at 10-11) . In 
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other words, the District Court weighed the evidence and took from 
a jury a determination that properly belonged to it. Mr. Critten-
den had satisfied his burden of showing a disputed issue of fact, 
and he should have been permitted to elaborate to a jury the 
reasons he was prevented him from telling his side of the story. 
Because of the existence of these factual disputes and erroneous 
legal conclusions, summary judgment in favor of Alpine School 
District was improper and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
A. Vesting Of Early Retirement Benefits. 
As a general rule, the adoption of a pension plan by an 
employer is an offer for a unilateral contract, such that the plan 
may be viewed as an offer to the employee. An employee accepts the 
offer by his or her continued employment, and continued employment 
constitutes the underlying consideration for the promise. A 
pension plan is thus "an offer which ripens into a contract upon 
the fulfillment of conditions by the performance of the employee.11 
Auerbach's. Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1911); 
Schofield v. Zions Co-Qp Mercantile Institution. 85 Utah 281 
(1934) . 
When an employee makes ,fthe requisite contributions and [has] 
satisfied all conditions precedent to his benefits, then the 
employee [has] a *vested right' in his retirement benefits.11 Ellis 
v. Utah State Retirement Board. 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah App. 1988). 
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The pension plan, as outlined in Alpine School District's Policy 
No. 4752, provides that in order for an employee to fulfill the 
conditions for early retirement benefits, the employee must either 
••have accumulated 30 years of educational service in Alpine School 
District and choose to retire early (prior to the 65th birthday); 
or . . . have attained 30 years of service in Utah and have at 
least 15 years of services in Alpine School District." (Alpine 
School District Policy No. 4752.1.3.1 and 4752.1.3.3 (1986)). 
Jim Crittenden began employment with Alpine School District 
in 1957, and his contract with Alpine School District "ripened" in 
1987, when, at age 52, he attained 30 years of service in Alpine 
School District and chose to seek early retirement. "The offer is 
[sic] such cases constitutes a promise for a completed act, and 
once the act is completed by the acceptor the offer cannot be 
modified or withdrawn. It becomes a binding contract." Auer-
bach's. Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1977) (quoting 
Schofield v. Zions CO-OP Mercantile Institution. 85 Utah 281, 287 
(1934)). 
When Jim Crittenden reached 30 years of service for Alpine 
School District, the requisite act was completed and he fulfilled 
his part of the early retirement contract. At that same time, 
Alpine School District became bound to its offer of early 
retirement benefits to Jim Crittenden. The offer could not "be 
modified or withdrawn." Thus, by refusing to grant Jim Crittenden 
*1 
his early retirement benefits, Alpine School District did not 
fulfill its part of the contract. 
B. Timeliness 
The District Court's primary rationale for upholding the 
denial of Mr. Crittenden's early retirement benefits relies upon 
Alpine School District's assertion that Mr. Crittenden failed to 
apply for the benefits before March 1, 1991. Secondarily, the 
District Court relies upon the fact that there is no language to 
the effect that early retirement benefits are available to persons 
who are terminated for cause. 
Mr. Crittenden, however, contends that Alpine School Dis-
trict's decision to deny Mr. Crittenden his early retirement 
benefits was not based upon any question of timeliness, nor was the 
denial based upon any policy provision. Alpine School District did 
not assert timeliness as a defense, it did not raise timeliness an 
issue in its motion for summary judgment, and it has expressly 
stated that timeliness was not the reason why Mr. Crittenden's 
benefits were denied. 
2. Waiver 
The district chose to deny Mr. Crittenden early retirement 
benefits not for any failure to meet application deadlines, but 
"because his employment was involuntarily terminated due to 
criminal acts." (Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories, #26.). 
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In fact, while the District Court based its decision largely 
upon the question of timeliness, Alpine School Districts motion 
for summary judgment did not even raise the timeliness issue. 
Alpine School District's Motion for Summary Judgment does not 
assert as a defense or as grounds for denial of the benefits that 
timeliness was a factor; rather, Alpine School District argues that 
"This court should rule as a matter of law that plaintiff did not 
qualify for district early retirement benefits, because he did not 
retire early from employment; he was terminated for cause." 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
at 25). The district makes no mention of the timeliness issue as 
a basis for its motion. 
Mr. Crittenden pointed out to the District Court that in 
answers to interrogatories and in depositions, Alpine School 
District had denied that Mr. Crittenden's applications for early 
retirement benefits were rejected because they were not timely. 
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
at 2, 5). Nonetheless, the District Court found that the 
timeliness defense, though not pled, was controlling. The District 
Court thus held that Alpine School District did not waive the 
timeliness issue because it was not a "distinctly made" waiver. 
(Ruling, at 11). 
But notwithstanding Alpine School District's assertion that 
the timeliness issue was not determinative, and its failure to 
assert the defense in its pleadings, the District Court acted on 
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its own motion and ruled as a matter of law that Mr. Crittenden was 
not entitled to early retirement benefits because he did not make 
a timely application. Thus, the District Court's decision that the 
timeliness issue is controlling was in error. 
C. "Type of Administrator" for Whom the Benefits Were 
Meant 
The District Court found that, ancillary to the timeliness 
issue, the reason Mr. Crittenden was not entitled to early 
retirement benefits was that because of his termination for cause, 
he was not the "type11 of administrator for whom the early 
retirement benefits were designed. Mr. Crittenden made it clear to 
the District Court that no language existed in the school district 
policy which expressly precludes him from receiving early 
retirement benefits otherwise available to him. The policy does 
not say that early retirement benefits are not available to persons 
who are terminated for cause. The policy simply does not address 
that issue. 
While in some cases specified misconduct by an employee may 
result in forfeiture of pension or retirement benefits, especially 
where a contractual retirement provision states that an employee 
discharged for dishonesty is not entitled to receive any payment 
from the fund, no such contractual provisions exist either in 
Alpine School District policies or in the Utah Code. In the event 
of any ambiguity of interpretation of the contract, the language of 
the pension contract should be liberally construed in favor of the 
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pensioner. Driacrs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 142 
P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). 
But while no part of the Alpine School District policy 
provides for denial of early retirement benefits to employees who 
are terminated for cause, Alpine School District policy provisions 
do provide for the distribution of early retirement benefits to 
administrators who have met one of the following criteria: 
1.3.1 Have accumulated 30 years 
of educational service in 
Alpine School District 
and choose to retire 
early (prior to the 
sixty-fifth birthday) ; or 
1.3.2 H a v e c o m p l e t e d 
immediately prior to the 
request for early 
retirement a minimum of 
ten years professional 
experience in Alpine 
School District, be at 
least sixty years of age, 
and not have reached the 
sixty-fifth birthday; or 
1.3.3 Have attained at least 30 
years of service in Utah 
and have at least 15 
years of service in 
Alpine School District. 
(Alpine School District Policy No. 4752.1.3.1-3). Mr. Crittenden 
met all three of those criteria, and by the language of the policy, 
was, in fact, the type of administrator for whom the benefits were 
meant. 
In addition, Mr. Crittenden is currently collecting State of 
Utah retirement benefits as a result of his 33 years of service to 
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Alpine School District. There is little logic to Alpine School 
District's denial of early retirement benefits to Mr. Crittenden, 
where the State of Utah currently grants Mr. Crittenden retirement 
benefits based upon the same criteria. 
The District Court, however, ruled that Mr. Crittenden "is 
not the type of administrator for whom this policy was 
implemented." (Ruling, at 13). Again, the District Court, on 
Summary Judgment Motion, must construe all facts in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party—in this case, Mr. Crittenden, 
fBrown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, (Utah App. 1994)). 
The District Court admitted that Mr. Crittenden did not 
assert his motivation for seeking early retirement, and that he did 
not state that he sought early retirement because of health 
problems, the work had become more difficult, or because he wanted 
to get away from the daily grind. (Ruling, at 13). At the same 
time, the District Court did impute to Mr. Crittenden a motivation 
for seeking early retirement benefits out of a desire "to hang on 
to some benefit at a time when he was suspended and his termination 
was imminent." (Ruling, at 13). Such a construction of the facts 
was not an inquiry as to whether a reasonable jury faced with the 
evidence presented could return a verdict for Mr. Crittenden, but 
was, rather, an outright weighing of the facts by the District 
Court, and was therefore in error. See W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
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D. Lack of Procedural Due Process Prior to Deprivation of Early 
Retirement Benefits 
The District Court's imputation of motivation to Mr. Critten-
den demonstrates yet another difficulty in the Court's decision to 
uphold denial of Mr, Crittenden's early retirement benefits. Mr. 
Crittenden's early retirement benefits are a protected property 
interest. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, (Utah App. 
1988); Backman v. Bateman. 263 P.2d 561, (Utah 1953)). Thus, prior 
to any deprivation of those benefits, Mr. Crittenden was entitled 
to some kind of hearing to satisfy the procedural due process 
requirements of both the Utah and federal constitutions. Alpine 
School District makes no claim that it allowed Mr. Crittenden any 
hearing; rather, Mr. Crittenden applied for the benefits prior to 
the effective date of his termination, and was summarily denied 
those benefits without the benefit of any hearing whatsoever. 
E. Judicial Legislation 
The decision to deny Mr. Crittenden his contractually vested 
rights to early retirement benefits was based squarely upon the 
whim and caprice of district administrators. No policy provisions 
gave the administrators guidelines to decide as they did. The 
District Court erred in interpreting the policy, absent language in 
the district policy itself, so as to deny Mr. Crittenden early 
retirement benefits. 
Regardless of whether the District Court saw the policy as a 
contract or as a governing and regulating instrument, it is the 
i 
function of the District Court to construe the policy as it is 
written, not as it could or might have been written. (See Hoth v. 
White, 799 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah App. 1990)(holding that the court 
"will not rewrite a contract to alleviate a contracting party's 
mistake, but will construe it according to its terms as it is 
written."); American States Ins. Co. v. Utah Transit. 699 P.2d 
1210, 1213-14 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J. concurring)(An omission may 
simply reflect a legislative oversight; however, the statute as 
written is the statute the court must construe: "If the current law 
does not accurately reflect the intent of its makers, changes . . 
. should be addressed to the legislature."); see also Transp. Auth. 
v. Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 493 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Mass. 1986) 
(holding that it is the function of the court to construe the law 
as written, "and an event for which no provision has been made does 
not justify judicial legislation.")). 
The fact that under Alpine School District policy employees 
are not subject to forfeiture of early retirement benefits in case 
of termination for cause, whether through oversight or inadvertence 
by the makers of the policy, does not justify stretching the words 
of the school district policy in order to accomplish a result not 
expressed or intended by that policy. An event or contingency for 
which no provision in the policy has been made, such as the event 
of Mr. Crittenden's termination, does not justify judicial 
legislation by the District Court. The District Court's decision 
was therefore in error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crittenden has been denied his early retirement which 
have considerable value in terms of health and accident insurance 
and a regular cash income, because he used a school district 
purchase order to purchase approximately $650.00 worth of 
automotive goods, an activity which was common and acceptable among 
school district employees. Rather than matching the infraction 
with a proportional penalty, Alpine School District has disregarded 
constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process to which Mr. 
Crittenden is entitled, both in deprivation of his employment and 
in his early retirement benefits. The judgment of the District 
Court must be reversed, if not in whole, then in part. 
DATED this / / day of July, 1997. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (S01) 377-4991 
Our File No. 20,838 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JIM F. CRITTENDEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO 
DEFENDANT 
Case No. 930400025 
Hon. Guy R. Burningham 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and submits the following interrogatories to the defendant 
to be answered in writing, under oath, by an officer of the defendant, in accordance with Rule 
33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. Describe the contract referred to in the Third Defense of defendant's Answer, 
specifically identifying the contract; stating whether it is an oral contract or a written contract; 
the date that it was entered into between the parties; who executed the contract on behalf of the 
defendant. 
22. Set forth specifically the manner in which the plaintiff did not faithfully perform 
all duties assigned to him as alleged in paragraph 11 of plaintiff s Complaint and denied by the 
defendant. 
23. Set forth the manner in which the defendant allegedly followed the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 53A-8-104, as alleged in paragraph 14 of plaintiffs Complaint. 
24. Set forth the manner in which the plaintiff did not meet the requirements set 
forth in § 49-2-802, Utah Code Ann., as alleged in paragraph 20 of plaintiffs Complaint and 
denied by the defendant. 
25. Set forth all facts upon which defendant relies to substantiate its denial of 
paragraph 21 of plaintiffs Complaint, wherein it is alleged that the defendant has failed and 
refused to allow the plaintiff to apply for early retirement, which allegation the defendant has 
denied. 
26. State whether or not the plaintiff has, in fact, filled out a form for early 
retirement. 
27. If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the affirmative, set forth the 
date upon which the application for early retirement was filled out by the plaintiff and the date 
that it was placed in the plaintiffs file with the district offices of defendant. 
28. State whether or not the defendant has ever allowed its employees to use district 
resources and telephones to make long distance telephone calls for which the employees were 
allowed to reimburse the district for said expenses. 
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APPENDIX B 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
J. MARK WARD - 4436 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Alpine School District 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JIM F. CRITTENDEN, : 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
Plaintiff, : SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
v. : 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
Defendant, : 
: Civil No. 930400025 
: Judge Burningham 
Defendant answers plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories as follows: 
Interrogatory No. l: Describe the contract referred to 
in the Third Defense of defendant's Answer, specifically 
identifying the contract; stating whether it is an oral contract or 
a written contract; the date that it was entered into between the 
parties; who executed the contract on behalf of the defendant. 
Angwgy £a Interrogatory No. l: Written materials 
evidencing the contract between the parties include the actual 
written contractual documents signed and executed each year between 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 25: Defendant never stopped 
plaintiff from applying for early retirement. Plaintiff has failed 
to prove otherwise. Without waiving its position as to whether 
plaintiff was entitled to so-called early retirement, defendant, 
through Assistant Superintendent Dr. Susan Stone, sent plaintiff, 
because he specifically requested them, the forms that constitute 
an employee's application for early retirement. Also, the District 
made it clear to plaintiff that it would cooperate in any way 
possible to facilitate Mr. Crittenden's drawing out his normal 
state retirement from the state retirement office. However, it was 
the position of the District that plaintiff did not qualify for the 
District's early retirement policy since his employment ceased as 
a result of a job action initiated against him by the District. 
Interrogatory No. 26: State whether or not the plaintiff 
has, in fact, filled out a form for early retirement. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 26: As indicated in the 
preceding interrogatory, the appropriate forms to apply for such 
early retirement were requested by plaintiff; the defendant, 
through Assistant Superintendent Stone, mailed these forms to the 
plaintiff; and the forms were never sent back to Dr Stone's 
knowledge. However, this was not dispositive of the District's 
decision to deny plaintiff's request to participate in the District 
early retirement program. The plaintiff, by himself and through 
his attorney, communicated to defendant his desire to participate 
in the District early retirement program, and the District was well 
enough aware of this desire. Defendant's denial of plaintiff's 
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participation in this early retirement program was not due to any 
imagined irregularity with respect to whether the forms were 
properly filled out, and defendant objects to and deplores any 
insinuation on the part of the plaintiff to suggest that defendant 
denied plaintiff early retirement due to a clerical oversight in 
the filling out of forms- As communicated over and over to 
plaintiff and his attorney by defendant and its attorney in 1991, 
plaintiff failed to qualify for district early retirement because 
his employment was involuntarily terminated due to criminal acts. 
Interrogatory No. 27: If the answer to the preceding 
interrogatory is in the affirmative, set forth the date upon which 
the application for early retirement was filled out by the 
plaintiff and the date that it was placed in the plaintiff's file 
with the district offices of defendant. 
Aiigwsr to IpteSTPqWry NP» ?7: S e e t h e a n s w e r t o t h e 
preceding interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No. 28: State whether or not the defendant 
has ever allowed its employees to use district resources and 
telephones to make long distance telephone calls for which the 
employees were allowed to reimburse the district for said expenses. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 26: In the past the 
District's policy in this regard is that employees keep track of 
their personal long distance calls on a log and then periodically 
reimburse the district for the cost of such calls. In recent 
years, some schools in the District have gone to a policy that 
requires employees to use their own personal long distance credit 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
JIM F. CRITTENDEN. 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Defendant. 
) 
) CIVIL NO. 
) 
) DEPOSITION OF; 
) JIM F. CRITTENDEN 
) 
) Held March 25. 1996 
) 
) REPORTED BY: 
) RENEE L. STACY. CSR. RPR 
Deposition of JIM F. CRUTENDEN. taken on behalf 
of the Defendant, at 160 Bast 300 South, Sixth Floor, 
Salt Lake city. Utah, comencino at 9:05 a.n. on 
March 25, 1996. before RENEE L. STACY, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public in and for the state of Utah, 
pursuant to Notice. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
March 25. 1996 
9:05 a.n. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
JIM F. CRITTENDEN 
called as a witness at the instance and request of 
the Defendant, having been first duly sworn, was 
exanlned and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
6Y MR. HARD: 
Q Good noming. Mr. Crittenden, would you 
state your full nam for the record, please. 
A My given nana Is Jimie Frazier 
Crittenden. 
Q All right. Mr. Crittenden. I had served on 
you through your counsel a Notice of Deposition and a 
request to produce docunents at the taking of this 
deposition and I'd like to go through that, first of 
all. and see what you have pursuant to that request. 
Maybe your counsel can handle that, but — do you 
have that, counsel, or — 
MR. PETERSEN.* Sure. Do you want to go off 
the record on this? 
MR. VARD: Let's go off for a ninute and 
PAGE 2 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: PPH R. 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
Salt Lake city. UT 84111 
I N D E X 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VARD 3 
BY MR. PETERSEN 170 
E X H I B I T S 
Defendant's Harked Discussed 
l 6-5-91 handwritten letter 66 67 
REQUESTS OF COUNSEL - BY n*. HARD 
Page 137. line 1 Date of last paycheck 
PAGE 4 
1 see what you've got and then we'll nake a record. 
2 (Discussion off the record.) 
3 MR. HARD: Let's go back on the record. 
4 Q Mr. Crittenden, your counsel has Just 
5 handed ne various docunents which purport to be in 
6 response to defendant '9 request to produce docunents 
7 at the taking of this deposition. To your knowledge. 
8 sir. are these docunents which your counsel has just 
9 handed ne. are these all the docunents that you have 
10 In your possession that is responsive to these 
11 requests to produce? 
12 A Hen, sir. without going through each one 
13 specifically — I would have to look at then 
14 specifically so that I knew possibly which one you 
15 referred to or whatever, you know. There's quite a 
16 pile there. 
17 Q Have you had an opportunity to review the 
18 request to produce docunents that I have referred to? 
19 A Yes. sir. 
20 Q Do you recall that there were 
21 approxinateiy — well, there are exactly 32 requests 
22 that were set forth in writing. Did you have a 
23 chance to review those 32 written requests? 
24 MR. PETERSEN: Maybe I can Just clarify. 
25 They're the ones that we could find at this tine. Ue 
DFPTNttY PPPnPTTVff QPTnrrrrc \ir taai\ r jo-noo 
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I 1 A No. It Isn't. 
I 2 Q Why not? 
I 3 A Because — for several things. Nunber one, 
I 4 I ouess what you do for one. you ought to do for all. 
1 5 and you can't do that. That isn't feasible. It was 
6 done for Dave Beal because he happened to be a friend 
7 of nine. I knew vhat I uas doing at the tins that 
8 took place, with the understanding It would he paid 
s back. I didn't try to take advantage of the 
10 district. Dave Beal is as honest as the day is long. 
I 11 Q But as a general natter, you would agree 
12 that — 
I 13 A It was wrong. 
I 14 Q It's Just not good policy? 
I 15 A No. 
16 Q It's not right to be — no natter how 
17 trustworthy the individual is. it's not approprlats 
I IB to be using district resources that way? 
I 19 A It isn't. 
I 20 Q Let ne see If I have any nore questions 
21 about this Dave Beal natter. We'll return to a 
I 22 question I touched on earlier. When I asked It. It 
I 23 kind of got us into the Dave Beal subject natter, 
24 but are you saying that the district's policy was 
I 25 such that you — that people who use this kind of — 
45 
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1 strike that. 
2 Are you saying that people who use district 
3 property like this for their own use. are you saying 
4 that, by virtue of sone policy of the district, that 
5 they have a right not to be terninated if they're 
6 caught? 
7 A l*n saying that they ought to be consistent 
8 in their policy. 
9 Q well, let's understand, first, what their 
10 policy is. Okay. You're telling ne — I think what 
11 you're telling ne is they're not being consistent in 
12 their policy. What do you understand their policy to 
13 be? 
14 A Okay. Let *s take 34 years. There was a 
15 tine, UP until Just a feu years ago, when you could 
16 go to the warehouse and buy anything the warehouse 
17 stocked and It would cone out of your paycheck. 
IB Q You could buy it and they would deduct it 
19 fron your paycheck? 
20 A Yes. You could pick it up, order it. and 
21 it would cone out of your paycheck. That went on for 
22 years. Having purchased a power saw, steel for pipe 
23 panels for a fence — l*n Just thinking of a few 
24 things that I purchased there. Fertilizer, water 
25 softener salt, a lauimower. 
_ . P M B 4 7 
1 Then, with the change of sdntnlstrstlon — 
I 2 Q imtch uas when, roughly? 
I 3 A At the tine I believe when Clark cox cane 
I 4 in as superintendent. 
I 5 Q Okay. 
I 6 A The district said no nore purchases out of 
I 7 the warehouse. 
B Q The district changed their policy? 
9 A Yes. 
I 10 Q Did you have a problen with that change? 
I 11 A NO. NO. 
I 12 Q Okay. 
I 13 A No. I had no problen with it. 
I 14 Q Okay. Go ahead. 
I 15 A And then. see. there -wes s tins — when I 
I 18 took this Job in transportation, the nechanics could 
I 17 bring their vehicles into the bus garage, service 
I 18 then, keep track of the oil they put beck in then. 
I 19 pay for the filter, end they're on their way. Really 
I 20 all they used was the hoist end the electricity If it 
I 21 was after hours. 
I 22 Then with the change of people in 
I 23 personnel, with Dr. Lloyd, then to Jack HcKelvey. 
I 24 when Jack cane in. It was — you couldn't use any 
I 25 district resource, period. 
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1 Q So that *s a rule that cane when Jack 
2 HcKelvey cane in? 
3 A I believe, yes. when Jack HcKelvey cane in. 
4 Q When did that happen. Just roughly? 
5 A Let's see. Hou long hes he been there? I 
6 guess he's been there since around '8B or '89. 
7 sonething like that. 
8 Q In any event, to your recollection, that 
9 rule cane out when HcKelvey cane in? 
10 A Yes. uh-nuh. 
11 Q Okay. 
12 A Because, see. natntenance people were 
13 rebuilding engines, doing things in their area. 
14 according to the hearsay of nechanics. I don't pay 
15 any attention to that hearsay, but It was happening 
16 in ny departnent. I saw vehicles in there and I 
17 didn't think the guys were really taking advantage. 
IB but I understood the — 
19 Q The rule? 
20 A The rule. 
21 Q I think you Just answered ny question when 
22 you said I understand the rule, but 1*11 ask it. 
23 anyway. So did you have a problen with this rule 
24 that cane out of the district when nocelvev cane in? 
25 A No. sir. I didn't. I didn't have a problen. 
46 I 
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I i Q And did you eeek to try to clean things — 
2 well — 
3 A ye did. 
I < Q yeah. Did you try to clean things up? 
5 A Absolutely, ve did. 
I 6 Q In other words, you tried to clear up this 
7 problan of personal vehicles inside the garage? 
I 8 A I did. I vent and called a meting of ny 
s mechanics and ve told then vhat the new policy vas. 
I IB and as far as I know, to this day thev adhere to It. 
I 11 Q You let then know that that vas the policy? 
I 12 A Certainly. 
I 13 Q You told then you supported the policy? 
I 14 A You hat. 
I 15 Q You told then that there would be action 
16 taken against then If thev violated the policy? 
17 A No. I didn't tell then that. 
18 Q Veil, did vou out any teeth behind your — 
19 vhat teeth vas there behind your ultlnatun? Just 
I 20 your authority, your atatanant? 
I 21 A I don't have to threaten people. 
I 22 Q Hell. okay. So. vhat? Just the authority 
I 23 of — you're the boas, vou nade the statement, and 
24 that-8 authority enough? I man. that's fine If 
I 25 that's the case. I Just vant to know. 
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1 A Certainly. I asked people to do things; 
2 thev would do it. I did not have to threaten 
3 anyone. 
4 Q Okay. That vas the lav and you laid It 
5 down, right? 
6 A My people knew, bus drivers. You know, the 
7 safety of kids vas always a concern for ne. 
6 Q But as far as people having their personal 
9 vehicles in there and using things for their personal 
10 gain or their personal autos or vhat ever, you told 
11 then that had to atop, right? 
12 A Absolutely. 
13 Q Okay. So than vas that your understanding 
14 of the policy? 
15 A Uh-huh. 
16 Q So I guess that brings m full circle then 
17 to ny question — back to ny original question, which 
IB is: Mhat would there be in the district's policy 
19 that would give you the right or anybody the right 
20 vno nlauaas district property to not be teminated If 
21 they're caught? 
22 A He or anyone elae? 
23 Q sure, 
24 A I would like to be treated like everyone 
25 elae. I have a principal that will testify today 
_ . PAGE 51 
I l that he used a purchase order for his own personal I 
I 2 Iten efter this cane down on ne. Vent to en I 
I 3 assistant superintendent. Ne vas told get it paid I 
I 4 for. and nothing happened to hln. I 
I 5 Q Vhat principal vas that? I 
I 6 A It vas B U I Delaney. He vas at Pleasant I 
7 erove High School at the tine. I 
I e Q Hhen did this occur? I 
I 9 A I can't tell vou the dates on it. B U I I 
I 10 will testify to It. I've talked to B U I about It. I 
I 11 Q He vas principal where? j 
I 12 A At Pleasant Grove high School at the tine. I 
I 13 He's now the principal at Mountain View High School. I 
I 14 Q This happened while you vers enploved? I 
I 15 A Uh-huh. So It vas probably around in 1990. I 
I 16 possibly. [ 
17 Q All right. 
I 18 A Maybe the first part of *9l. [ 
I 19 Q All right. So I see this — I*n trying to j 
I 20 organize all this, and the way I see It is you're | 
I 21 saying that there are instances where people have [ 
I 22 used property, district property in one fom or 
I 23 fashion, and whatever has happened to then, they have 
I 24 not been teminated? 
25 A Right. 
I 51 1 
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I l 0 Okay. Understanding that ~ and we'll go 
I 2 into all those instances in a ninute. 
3 A Okay. 
1 4 Q I vant to know every instance you're aware 
J 5 of. 
6 A Okay. 
1 7 Q And I'n sure sone of these docunents relate 
I 8 to it. plus you nay just have your recollection. 
I 9 like this Delaney. You nay not have any 
I 10 documntation. but vou have Just your recollection. 
I 11 But est ting that aside for a ninute, understanding 
I 12 your contention, which is that there are sone 
I 13 district enplovees who have used district property 
I 14 and have not been teminated, ny question, air. is 
I 15 this: Are you aware of any policy, district 
I 16 policy — and let's start vlth written policy, okay? 
I 17 Are you aware of any written policy which gives 
I 18 aonaone like that, aomone vno is caught n l SUB ins 
I 18 district property for their own personal gain or 
J 20 whatever, are you aware of any written policy which 
I 21 would give that person the right not to be 
I 22 teminated? And if you're not. fine. I just vant to 
I 23 know. 
24 A No. 
25 Q Okay. Let's shift the question a l i t t l e 
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I l bit. Are vou aware or any written letters or other 
I 2 form of written connun I cation fron the district or 
I 3 anybody on the district level fron vhich you could 
4 infer that persons vno get cauont using district 
I 5 property for their own use have the right not to be 
I 6 temtnated? I'm asking the sane question that I'd 
I 7 ask with respect to policies, but I'n now shifting to 
I B any kind of written connun l cat ion. other than a 
I 9 written policy. 
I IB A Not that I can recall of. I don't rananber 
I 11 anything like that where it said they'd be — what 
I 12 you're saving, where you're saying that they would be 
I 13 terminated. 
I K G No. I'n saying that — okay. You're 
I 15 saying — you're telling ne, Mr. Crittenden, that 
I 16 you're snare of sone people who have used district 
I 17 property for their own use. and whatever the district 
18 did to than, they did not teminate then. 
I 19 A Correct. 
I 20 Q All right. And I asked you a nlnute ago. 
I 21 Just to nake sure you understand the question. 
I 22 whether you're aware of any policy that would protect 
I 23 a person like that, any district written policy that 
I 24 would say that If a person Is caught using district 
I 25 property for their own use. they should not be 
S3 
1 terminated, that whatever happens to then, they 
2 should not be terminated? Are you aware of any euch 
3 policy? 
4 A To answer your question. Hark, it seens to 
5 ne that the policy ought to say if, in fact, there 
6 was a problen. that you would have due process. You 
7 could et least have e hearing. I know of no policy 
8 like that. 
9 Q Okay. But you would agree — you haven't 
10 quite answered ny question. And I appreciate your 
11 point, and that's something I'll take note of, but 
12 let's deal with ny question for a ninute here. And 
13 I'n sorry I can't state It nore clearly or nore 
14 artfully, but I'n going to try it again. 
15 Are you aware of any written policy by the 
16 school district which says that persons who get 
17 caught using district property for their own use 
18 should not be temtnated? 
18 A I can't recall of any policy like that that 
20 I'n — I'n not aware of any. 
21 Q Sane question, but now I would ask it with 
22 respect to any written communications, like bulletins 
23 or letters. Are you aware of any bulletins or 
24 letters or memoranda or any kind of written 
25 communication from the district that would imply that 
- _ PAGE 55 
I l people who get ceught using district property for 
I 2 their own use should not be terminated? 
I 3 i*n Just shifting the question a little bit 
I 4 now to — we already asked the question about 
I 5 policies. Nov I'm Just asking s question shout 
I 6 letters or nenoranda or bulletins. Are there any 
7 such written communications that would give a peraon 
I 8 the right not to be terminated if they were caught 
I 8 using district property for their own use? 
I 10 A I suppose not. 
I 11 Q Okay. Sane question but now I'm going to 
I 12 shift It e little bit differently. Are you ewere of 
I 13 any verbal statements by district level people thet 
I 14 would give e person the right not to be terminated in 
I 15 the event thev were caught using district property 
I 16 for their own use? Notice I'm Just shifting the 
I 17 question. I started with policies. Then I started 
I 18 wtth any written communications. Now I'm talking 
I 19 about any verbal communications. 
I 20 A Yee. I understand. To answer your 
I 21 question, in 34 years. Hark. I never had a problem 
I 22 with Alpine School Dletrict, and I don't remember in 
I 23 any of the superintendent's meetings, any of the 
I 24 meetings I ever attended where that specifically was 
I 25 a concern or a problem. I recall no verbalization on 
55 
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1 that. 
2 Q Feir enough. I appreciate that. And 
3 thanks for bearing with ne on that line of 
4 questions. So if I understand your contention — and 
5 that's the purpose of this deposition, for me to 
6 totally understand and have it out clear as I can. 
7 If I understand your contention, your contention is 
8 that you should not have been terminated for using 
9 district property for your own personal use because 
10 others weren't? Is that your position? 
11 A No. 
12 Q What's your position? 
13 A ny position is. at this tine. Hark. I 
14 earned ny early retirement. I gave them 34 years. 
15 And I love ny Job. I love people in that district 
16 where I live. I'm very veil known in that area. Ry 
17 position is ny family and I deserve that early 
18 retirement, especially the insurance that they took 
19 away from me. 
20 Q The nodical insurance? 
21 A Yes. sir. Now. whether or not the powers 
22 that be can administer their policies and do it 
23 equitable for the number of employees they have, 
24 that'& their problen. Ry position is that before I 
25 was temtnated I deserved a hearing. I received no 
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l hearing. 
I 2 It wasn't a eecret what they, the Board of 
I 3 Education, fired ne for fron the etandpolnt of what I 
I 4 did. It was not a eecret. the ttens outlined In 
I 5 Susan Stone's letter why they let ne go and what I 
6 was teminated for. Ue have discussed one of then at 
I 7 length. Dave Beal's situation. I believe. 
I e The other, there Is s statemnt here fron 
8 Al vuksintcirs business that was an error, a billing 
I 10 error. The other one they have is nv use of a 
11 purchase order to Rick Darner Port, le really the 
I 12 reason they let ne go. I had a nechanlc with ne. He 
13 was with ne when I took the purchase order beck to 
I 14 the desk, and I was teminated for that. 
I 15 Q Hell, let's go back to nv question. Your 
I 16 contention, than, goes just to early retiremnt? 
I 17 A And danaoes nou. 
I is Q Hell, are you saying you had a right not to 
I 19 be teminated? 
I 2B A I'n saying I had e right to a hearing that 
I 21 I was denied. I was not given e hearing. I was 
I 22 fired on the spot, after 34 veers, and 1*11 defy you 
I 23 to find a person down there that said I wasn't a 
I 24 productive enplovee for 34 veers. I don't care what 
I 25 ares YOU so to. fron the tine I coached, that I 
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i taught, that I was a vice principal t i l l I went to 
2 the district office. 
3 Q And what would you have done if you had a 
4 hearing? 
5 A I would liked to have explained to those 
6 people why I used the purchase order, the way it cane 
7 about, and have a nechanic testify as to what was 
B said to hin when I picked the stuff up and as I 
9 returned it to the garage. 
10 Q Didn't you plead guilty In the crininal 
11 prosecution? 
12 A On a reduced charge. 
13 Q What did you plead to? 
14 MR. PETERSEN: If sou renenber. 
15 A I can't renenber the — hou It was stated. 
16 Hark. Maybe Don can look at it. 
17 Q (BY MR. HARD) Are you aware that the fact 
18 of your crininal Investigation and sour ultinats plea 
19 were facts that ware known to the school district? 
20 A Huh-uh. I didn't knov — I didn't know 
21 anything was even going on as far as an 
22 investigation. 
23 Q Hhat. I m a n is the ultinate outcone of that 
24 investigation, which was a plea on your part. I man. 
25 were you aware that that was a fact that was known to 
_ _ PAGE SB 
1 the school district? 
I 2 A It was known to the world. 
I 3 Q Okay. Which would Include the school 
I 4 district? 
I s A Certainly. 
I 6 Q Okay. Hell, so — I realize, you know, vou 
I 7 don't knov the — you nay not appreciate the fine 
I 8 legal distinctions here that perhaps your counsel and 
I s I would delve into, but I'n trying to understand what 
I 10 the basts — what the bone or your contention is. if 
I li you will, and what I'n hearing is that the bone of 
I 12 voir contention is that vou weren't given a hearing. 
I 13 A I wasn't, no. sir. 
I 14 Q Let's talk about the basic Question. 
I 15 though, of whether imat you did and what you pled to. 
I 16 which was use of district property — well, we 
I n won't — I won't try to characterize what vou pled 
I IB to. because vou said you can't renenber. but let'a 
I 19 approach It again. 
I 20 Hhen we talk about what vou did. the use of 
I 21 the property, would vou agree that, when we talk 
I 22 about district policy, as a natter of policy, that 
I 23 that's an offense which is the basis for 
I 24 tern I nation? 
I 25 MR. PETERSEN: I'n sorry. I didn't follow 
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1 that question. Hhat was that again, nou? 
2 Q (BY MR. HARD) would you agree that what 
3 you did here, the use of the property that you did do 
4 here, that vou did carry out. that that is a basis — 
5 as a ratter of district policy, that is a basis for 
6 the district to teminate your enploynent? 
7 MR. PETERSEN: Nou. are ue talking 
8 specifically about the Susan Stone letter? Which 
9 instance are we talking about? 
10 MR. HARD: we're talking about the totality 
11 of what he did here that was — you nentioned three 
12 incidents, right? 
13 MR. PETERSEN: They're the ones that are 
14 nentioned in Susan Stone's letter. 
15 MR. HARD: Right. Hell. okay. Pair 
16 enough. Let's go to Susan Stone's letter. 
17 The reasons for temination, she says, are 
18 specific actions which Involve your nisuse of 
19 district resources to pay for repairs to your 
20 personal vehicle, a repair on a friend's personal 
21 vehicle and repairs on your son-in-lave vehicle. 
22 You have adnltted to the first two allegations. 
23 Let's stop right there. First of all. is 
24 that correct? You did adnlt to the first two 
25 allegations? 
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Hoo do uou put a dollar alon on tan. 
•are of a person's life? 
Veil. I'n assesstno economic loas right 
You know, I'm Just — anyway — okay. I 
ave an Idea of where you're con 1 no fron. 
bat** talk about — sou talk about 
economics and insurance, and ny wife's colitis 
because of nerves, and we're talking econonlcs. 
right? 
Q yell, you're talking the acononlc value of 
the health Insurance that vou lost. Does aha have 
Insurance through her work? 
A She's picked ne up. but her Insurance lan't 
nearly as good as the district's. 
Q Are you still in that gap before you can 
get Hedlcare or Medicaid or whatever? 
A Yeeh. 
Q Are vou? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Hhat about — lan't there eons kind of a 
retirement benefit that Includes a health benefit as 
part of your regular retirement or not? 
A Pron abere? 
Q I'n asking. 
A I don't think so. Not that I know of. 
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1 MR. HARD: Okay. Just one ninute here. 
2 (Tine lapse.) Thanks for your tine. I have no 
3 further questions. 
4 MR. PETERSEN: I just have a couple 
5 follow-up questions. Can I get Susan Stone's letter 
6 there? 
7 MR. HARD: Oh. veah. The June 5th letter? 
8 MR. PETERSEN: Yes. 
9 EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. PETERSEN: 
11 Q Jin. referring to Dr. Susan Stone's letter 
12 to you of June 5th, 1931, she states in the second 
13 paragraph. "The reasons for termination are specific 
14 actions which involve your nlauae of diatrict 
15 resources to pay repairs to your personal vehicle.* 
16 Now, you've testified as to an incident that happened 
17 when vou bought aone parte at Rick Warner Ford; la 
IB that true? 
IS A Yas. sir. 
20 Q And you used those parte and the diatrict 
21 paid for then? 
22 A At the tine. 
23 Q And you reimbursed the district? 
24 A Yes. air. 
25 Q And it's your position that the district 
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allowed or had a policy, whatever, that that could be 
dooe? 
A Yes. 1 
Q Okay. Nou. ware there any other incidents | 
where you used district resources to pay repairs for 
a personal vehicle, other than that one? 
A NO. 1 
Q Okay. She says the next reason — ' 
MR. HARD: Excuse ne. Mean mean!no your 
own personal vehicle? • 
MR. PETERSEN: Yes. | 
Q She states the next reason, a repair of a 
friend's personal vehicle. Now. you testified as to 
parts that vera purchased for David Baal. 1 
A Yes. air. 1 
Q Here there any other friends' vehicles. 
aside fron the one of David Baal vou Just testified 
to? 
A No. air. 
Q Now. he was an employee of the diatrict. 
was he not? 1 
A Yes. 1 
Q And he was allowed to pay it back, was he 
not? 
A Yes. he was. 
»_i 
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And he was not terminated, was he? 
No. He's still working. 
Then the third reason, she says, "And 
1 Q 
2 A 
3 Q 
4 repairs to your son-m-lav's vehicle." Nou. you've 
5 testified as to your son-m-lav? 
6 A Yes. sir. 
7 Q And there was an improper billing? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q Okay. Here there any other incidents. 
10 other than this one that vou testified to. tnvolvtns 
11 a son-in-law? 
12 A None. 
13 Q That son-in-lav or another son-ln-lav? 
14 A No. air. 
15 Q So they're the three Incidents; la that 
16 correct? 
17 A Yea. 
IB Q Are vou aware of anything alee that ehe 
19 rafere to? 
20 A No. air. 
21 MR. PETERSEN: Okay. That's all. 
22 MR. WARD: Thanks. 
23 (Whereupon the taking of the deposition 
24 was concluded at 1:10 p.n.) 
25 • • • • 
172 
DEPOMAX REPORHNB SERVICES. LLC (881) 328-1188 
